Vitalik Buterin addressed, on October 8, 2026, the risks that advances in artificial intelligence pose to the cryptographic systems underpinning Bitcoin, Ethereum and other blockchain networks. His comments came in response to earlier warnings from researcher Justin Drake, who had urged the industry to prepare for a critical scenario he described as "bunker mode."
Drake had previously cautioned that an advanced mathematical model capable of breaking elliptic curve signatures, the ECDSA scheme used widely across crypto networks, could arrive within months, potentially causing a rapid and widespread failure of private keys.
Buterin identified ML-DSA, fully homomorphic encryption and lattice-based cryptographic systems as the central area of risk. He stated there is a considerable possibility that concrete lattice security will suffer serious blows within the next two years, a timeline that places pressure on protocols still relying on lattice constructions.
Ethereum's shift away from lattices
According to Buterin, Ethereum's technical roadmap has, over the past year, moved toward a hash-only direction, eliminating lattices and schemes such as Falcon from inside its zero-knowledge proofs. The optimized version of this approach relies instead on hash-based systems such as WOTS or SPHINCS-, which are not considered vulnerable to the same category of attack.
As a preventive measure, Buterin recommended multiplying key size by ten. He was careful, however, to temper any sense of urgency, stating that he does not recommend rushing to move funds to new wallets at this moment.
Practical guidance for users
Buterin agreed with Drake that safeguarding assets in previously unused addresses is a sound precaution, provided the process remains simple for the owner. He added a personal caution on this point, revealing that he has lost more money due to poorly executed migrations than from all the hacks he has suffered combined.
For privacy protocols, Buterin recommended against storing encrypted notes directly on the blockchain, suggesting instead that they be sent off-chain through third-party mechanisms. For multisig wallets, he suggested performing confirmations off-chain as well, in order to avoid prematurely exposing the individual cryptographic signatures of each signer.
In a correction posted after his initial publication on X, Buterin clarified that the ideal security rule for such vaults requires each signer to change their key after every operation, refining his earlier guidance on how multisig arrangements should be structured to limit exposure.
